Torii Wallet contracts#

One vault contract per mandate, created by a factory. Base Sepolia (chain 84532) only. Testnet: cleared for testnet by audit R2; a mainnet list is open.

Addresses#

Item	Address
ToriiMandateFactory	`0x39e8a6dba45983c779C8A249fca40f2026a2f873`
ToriiMandate implementation	`0xB63F6Aba4d4147dCF364f0E8B145630b123dd7f8`
USDC (Base Sepolia)	`0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e`
First rehearsal vault (stopped, withdrawn)	`0x128Ba6B938789EB5F0bf1Ec3bcc8D8f957B0CB8E`
Hosted rehearsal vault, mandate `m_irifvvp7rr` (stopped, withdrawn)	`0x06b6da180D35b27997cC2f57731d66beee86fa39`

The factory address is read from TW_MANDATE_FACTORY_ADDRESS on the API host. While it is unset, no vault exists and no money moves. This table is filled from deployments/base-sepolia.json. The rehearsal vault was created, funded with 1 USDC, paused, resumed, stopped and emptied on 2026-10-13 (64 of 64 checks, transactions in the testnet runbook section 7); it is a record, not a live vault. The same day a second vault was made through the production API (10 USDC deposited, paused, stopped and withdrawn, vault balance 0; transactions in the testnet runbook section 7b); it is also a record.

Roles#

Role	Who	Can	Cannot
`owner`	The person	`create` (own mandates only), `deposit`, `stop` (also revokes the agent), `withdrawAll` when allowed, `revokeAgent`, `setAgent`, `setFeeRecipient` (draft only), `removeTarget`, `unwind` and `rescueToken` after close	Add targets; change caps, floor or fee after creation
`agent`	A session signer	`execute` inside the caps while live; `unwind` after close on still-allowed targets (USDC may not go down; an agent unwind must raise it)	Stop, withdraw, mark, settle, touch USDC or the mandate as a target
`keeper`	The house; read live from the factory; rotated in two steps	`markWorth`, `stop`, `settle` (fee at most bps times on-chain profit)	Withdraw, execute, change limits
factory admin	The house	Grant and revoke roles	Touch any existing mandate or funds
pauser	The house, a separate key	`setPaused` (blocks new mandates only)	Anything else
keeper admin	The house, a separate key	`proposeKeeper`, `cancelKeeper`	Make a keeper live before `keeperDelay` (at least 1 day)

Parameters, fixed at creation#

perTxCap, dailyCap (rolling 24 hours, 24 hourly buckets), stopFloor (absolute USDC units), endsAt, allowedTargets[] (at most 16, never USDC or the mandate itself), agentFeeBps (at most 2000). USDC amounts are 6-decimal base units. The factory requires a 6-decimal USDC.

What the contract enforces#

Per-transaction cap, measured as the vault's USDC drop across the call, not parsed from calldata.
Rolling daily cap in hourly steps. At worst about twice the cap can leave inside one 24-hour stretch.
Allowed targets. execute(target, data, approveAmount) approves exactly approveAmount for one call and resets it to 0 in the same transaction.
The end time.
The stop line: when the keeper marks worth below stopFloor, trading stops and the owner may withdrawAll. A floor stop or keeper stop keeps the agent so it can unwind; an owner stop() also revokes the agent.
One settlement, only after endsAt or a stop. The agent fee is clamped to on-chain profit (balance - (deposited - withdrawn)).
Owner-only withdraw. Withdraw opens after a stop, after settlement, or one day after endsAt.
Agent revoke and setAgent.
Deposits are counted by balance change, and only through deposit(). A plain transfer to the vault is not a deposit.

What the contract does not do#

The chain enforces	The API only records or derives
Caps, targets, end time, stop on a floor mark, one settle, owner-only withdraw, agent revoke	Purpose text, payout wording, worth between marks, realized gain computation (the keeper passes it to `settle`), the four-state balance view, progress, anything about non-USDC assets

The daily cap limits how much can leave the vault, not what is lost at a venue the owner allowed. A target that holds value is a counterparty risk the owner accepted.

Trust assumptions (v1)#

The keeper is trusted for worth marks and settlement. On testnet one key holds every role; mainnet must split them. The keeper delay is immutable and at least one day.

Audits#

Round	Result
R1	2 High, 4 Medium found; fixed in the R1 fix pass (unwind, settle clamp, atomic execute, owner-only create, two-step keeper)
R2	Cleared for Base Sepolia; the Medium (owner stop did not stop the agent) and the Low (keeper delay of zero) were fixed

Sources (internal, not served here): ops/TORII_MANDATE_CONTRACTS.md, ops/TORII_TESTNET_DEPLOY.md, ops/TORII_AUDIT_R1.md, ops/TORII_AUDIT_R2.md.

Parked#

The Torii dollar (tUSD) reserve and token were parked on 2026-10-11. They are not part of the product and are not deployed.